Description
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations. Preface. 1. Inherent Imperfection of Economic Organizations; R.P. Gilles, P.H.M. Ruys. 2. The Kinked Demand Curve, facilitating Practices, and Oligopolistic Coordination; E. Kalai, M.A. Satterthwaite. 3. A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian Rationalizable Strategies; P.J. Hammond. 4. Widespread Externalities and Perfectly Competititve Markets: Examples; M. Kaneko, M. Wooders. 5. Modelling of Economies with Relational Constraints on Coalition Formation; R.P. Gilles, H.H. Haller, P.H.M. Ruys. 6. Topologies as Trade Infrastructures; H.H. Haller. 7. Demand in a Duopoly with Horizontal Product Differentiation; D. Furth. 8. Implementing Strong and Lower Strong Positive Association Social Choice Rules by Social Procedures; J. Greenberg. 9. Cooperation and Communication Restrictions: a Survey; P. Borm, A. van den Nouweland, S. Tijs. 10. Outline of the Implications of the Cooperative Nature of the Firm; T. Ichiisi. 11. Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex and the Simplotope; D. Talman. 12. A Social Power Index for Hierarchically Structured Populations of Economic Agents; R. van den Brink, R.P. Gilles.
